argument in regards to Nonabsolute Existence and Conceptual Relativism is an
extremely argumentative topic that is highly debated among philosophers through
time. Per this article, philosopher Ernest Sosa attempts to debunk the ideas of
non-absolute existence and conceptual relativism, only to realize that
conceptual relativism is a mildly acceptable idea to explain reality. In this
paper, I will argue for the fact that existence is a scale between the theory
of absolutism and conceptual relativism, and that all ideals, actions and
schemas fall into this particular scale. In addition, all modes of existence
are possible. I will address this specific argument in three separate points.
First, I will address that Putnam was correct in stating that all of conceptual
relativism pertains to one’s own schema, and is primarily dependent upon
culture. The second point is that the absolutist theory is not all inclusive.
The final point in this argument is that most subjects and thoughts fall into
the scale between absolutism and conceptual relativism.
The reference article written by
Ernest Sosa, was a retort to Putnam’s ‘Pragmatic Realism’ ideals upon the
theory of non-absolute existence and conceptual relativity. Alternatively, the
idea of non-absolute existence pertains to the notion of relative existence, in
which “we recognize potential constituted objects only relative to our implicit
conceptual scheme with its criteria of existence and of perdurance” (565).
Thus, all ideas, thoughts, and actions are relative to a developed and
personalized schema, in which all components are not regarded as separate
entities. This theory clashes completely with the theory of absolutism where
“…snowballs, hills, trees, planets, etc., are all constituted by the in-itself
satisfaction of certain conditions by certain chunks of matter…and this goes on
independently of any thought or conceptualizing on the part of anyone” (565).
This idea can be validated through the concept of snowballs being sliced into
discs, thus forming an object referred to as a “snowdiscall”. The discs in of
itself are separate objects, in addition to the pieces of snow that constitute
it, which make up the entirety of the snowball. Per this idea of absolutism, in
which each component of an object is regarded as a separate object, there is an
issue of the explosion of reality. In the snowball example, the reductive
components are the snow discs and the pieces of snow. However, following this
theory, the pieces of snow itself can be reduced into smaller components, which
under this idea, would still be regarded as separate entities. After discussing
the varying theories, Sosa cannot comprehend which of the three choices
offered, eliminativism, absolutism and conceptual relativism, are “the least
disastrous” (565). In this case, Sosa may imply that he finds all theories
equally disheartening, or equally plausible in the case of explaining reality
for non-absolute existence.